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1 Introduction
How and to what extent individuals are able to adjust their working hours are important
questions in labor economics. The answers matter for understanding the empirical dynam-
ics of hours per worker, and for addressing policy issues such as the effects of payroll taxes,
fringe benefits and working-hours legislation. A long-standing view posits that workers need
to change jobs in order to adjust their hours (e.g., Altonji and Paxson [1988, 1992], Blundell
et al. [2008]), although certain empirical evidence somewhat qualifies this (Borowczyk-Martins
and Lalé [2019]). There is also a pervasive view that multiple jobholding is an effective channel
through which individuals can adjust their hours (Paxson and Sicherman [1996], Kahn and
Lang [1991, 2001]), since taking on a second job might offer a valuable alternative to an em-
ployer change. Yet we know little about the relationship between hours adjustments, job-to-job
changes, and multiple jobholding. In particular, there is no theory of how this relationship
affects labor market equilibrium, and of how it is in turn shaped by aggregate search frictions.
In this paper we attempt to develop such a theory. We propose a general equilibrium
model of the labor market with idiosyncratic fluctuations in hours worked, search both off-
and on-the-job, and multiple jobholding. The model enables us, first, to shed light on the
microdeterminants of the decision to hold several jobs, and, second, to examine and quantify
the implications of multiple jobholding on aggregate labor market outcomes.
A central tenet of the theory is worker-firm bargaining—notably, that multiple jobholders
bargain with their multiple (two in our case) employers. Allowing for this type of interaction
is not trivial. Consider, for instance, models descended from Burdett and Mortensen [1998], or
models in the vein of Postel-Vinay and Robin [2002a,b], where on-the-job search and employer-
to-employer transitions play a prominent role. A worker receiving an outside job offer moves to
the new firm right away, or holds onto the incumbent employer and has her wage raised while
immediately losing contact with the other employer. There is, hence, no prolonged interaction
between the worker and the two employers. This feature is not specific to wage posting or
sequential auctions. In Dey and Flinn [2005] and Cahuc et al. [2006], a worker is at some point
in contact with two firms and wages are set through bargaining. But there, again, the sequence
is played instantaneously until one of the employers can no longer bid up, meaning that the
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tripartite interaction lasts for an infinitesimal portion of time. To our knowledge, the challenge
of modeling a prolonged interaction between a worker and her several employers has not been
addressed fully, and certainly it has not been addressed along the lines that we set out below.
Specifically, the interaction rules of our model work as follows. Upon getting an outside
job offer, the employed worker is allowed to either move to the new employer, combine the
new job with her current job, or discard these two options and stay with the incumbent em-
ployer. If she chooses multiple jobholding, she commits to staying with the older employer
(called the "primary employer") until this job is no longer viable, while she may give up the
second job at any time. In return for this commitment, the worker is able to use the primary
job as her outside option to extract a higher wage from the bargain with the outside (called
the "secondary") employer, subject to a participation constraint on the employer’s side. In
some ways, this configures an environment that is the antipode to a Postel-Vinay and Robin
[2002a,b, 2004] world, where the worker would use the outside employer to improve wages at
the incumbent employer.1 We verify whether these interaction rules are reasonable by studying
their implications with respect to worker flows in and out of secondary jobs. We purposely
do not target these data moments in the model’s calibration and find that it performs well at
predicting them.
Another pillar of the proposed theory is hours worked, which are idiosyncratic to the match
between the worker and the firm and fluctuate over time, subject to some constraints. The
motivation for this is straightforward: whether or not a worker is able to take on a second
job depends heavily on the hours schedule of her primary job. In the model, in addition to
bargaining on wages, workers and firms also bargain on hours. We postulate a discontinuity in
the mapping between hours worked and labor market services that induces worker-firm pairs
to adopt high hours. This feature enables us to make important connections with the data,
by generating a meaningful distinction between full-time and part-time employment which is
relevant for explaining multiple jobholding inflows and outflows.2 More broadly, the model
1In certain economic environments, the action of the incumbent employer of matching the outside job offers
received by the worker is actually an assumption, and alternatively one could assume that the employer is
unable to commit to such an arrangement. In other settings, whether or not firms make these commitments
is an endogenous model outcome. In Postel-Vinay and Robin [2004] for instance, certain firms choose not to
match outside job offers to deter their workers from making extra on-the-job search efforts. They prefer to lose
workers to their competitors, albeit at a slow rate, rather than make frequent wage increases.
2Using a Markov-chain model to estimate transitions in and out of multiple jobholding, we document that
while full-time workers make up a larger share of multiple jobholding at the cross section, part-time workers are
more likely to flow in and flow out (Appendix B of this paper).
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offers a simple solution to capture certain aspects of the intensive margin of labor adjustment
(hours per worker) documented in Borowczyk-Martins and Lalé [2019], which the recent vintage
of search models featuring fluctuations in hours (e.g., Bils et al. [2012], Kudoh and Sasaki [2011],
Dossche et al. [2018], Kudoh et al. [2019]) are unable to produce.3 We believe this makes a
useful, independent contribution of the paper to this class of models.
In sum, the theoretical framework combines a Mortensen and Pissarides [1994]-like model
with a structure of very rich adjustments along the intensive margin: in addition to flows in and
out of employment, the model features worker movements within the distribution of working
hours, across employers, as well as movements in and out of multiple jobholding. All these
variables are determined endogenously. The key notions related to multiple jobholding, such
as the primary and secondary jobs, are also endogenous to the model. And since the model is
general equilibrium, it is easy to calibrate and usable for counterfactual analysis.
To illustrate the usefulness of our theory, we focus on understanding the secular decline
of multiple jobholding in the U.S. labor market. We investigate the sources of this evolution
jointly with those of declining job-to-job transition rates. We have two main sets of results.
The first one concerns the microdeterminants of multiple jobholding. According to our model, a
key parameter influencing that decision is the flow cost of working a second job, which comes in
addition to the flow cost of working the first job (measured by the flow value of unemployment
in the canonical search model). First, we find that it is sizable both compared to workers’
earnings and relative to the flow cost of working the first job. To fix ideas, we estimate that the
cost of working a second job amounts to 17 percent of average monthly earnings. We cannot
separate out monetary and nonmonetary components since utility is linear, but, given plausible
estimates of the expenditures necessitated by work, we think this suggests a substantial role for
nonmonetary factors. Second, search frictions, as measured by on-the-job search effort, play
a minor role in determining workers’ transitions into and out of multiple jobholding. Third,
and somewhat in contrast to the previous result, search frictions are important to draw proper
inference on the change in multiple jobholding over time. The reason is that we uncover a
substantial reduction in on-the-job search effort during the past 20 years based on declining
3Borowczyk-Martins and Lalé [2019] show that a large share of cyclical adjustments in hours per worker
reflect transitions between full-time and part-time employment, and that these entail sizable and lumpy ad-
justments in individuals’ working hours. Search models with hours fluctuations are unlikely to predict similar
patterns as they typically view hours as the outcome of a smooth optimization problem.
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job-to-job transition rates: search effort has decreased by 47 percent among men and by 38
percent among women. Ignoring such changes would lead to underestimating the concurrent
increase in the flow cost of working a second job. We find that increases of this cost by 12
percent for men and 5–6 percent for women account for the change of the employment share of
multiple jobholders since the mid-1990s in the United States.
The second set of results relates to the implications of multiple jobholding for search fric-
tions. We investigate how and through which channels changes in the cost of working a second
job affect vacancy posting. Our results indicate that the increase contributed positively to
vacancy-posting efforts, and therefore reduced search frictions from a worker’s perspective.
Several mechanisms are involved. First, when fewer employed workers are involved in multiple
jobs, a larger fraction of them engage into on-the-job search, meaning the aggregate number
of job seekers increases. This generates a positive externality on the decision of firms to open
up vacancies through the matching function. Second, conditional on meeting an employed
worker, there is a higher probability that she gives up her current job to accept the outside
job offer if the cost of the other option (working two jobs) has become higher. We call these
two channels the "extensive" and "intensive" margins of search, respectively. There is a third
mechanism at work: the increase in the cost of working a second job reduces the total surplus
of employment, and therefore lowers an employer’s surplus of filling a vacant position. In the
quantitative assessment, this third, negative effect is always dominated by the positive response
of the extensive and intensive margins of search.
The model has some additional implications that we explore in the paper. First, we fit
the model separately for men and women, and for each gender we analyze calibrations that
differ with respect to the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. What is noteworthy is that the
values of two key parameters remain virtually constant over those variants. The first one is the
flow cost of working a second job, which we described above. The other parameter is search
effort on the job. Its value consistently tells that the probability that an employed worker
receives a job offer is about 40 percent of the probability that a nonemployed worker gets an
offer. Despite this, the job-to-job transition rate is 15 times lower than the nonemployment-to-
employment transition rate. One reason suggesting that this estimate of on-the-job search effort
is more reliable than many available in the literature is that it takes accounts of both job-to-
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job transitions and multiple jobholding. We also study implications related to a long-standing
question in the literature, namely whether workers take on a second job in order to alleviate the
hours constraints they face in their primary job (Shishko and Rostker [1976], O’Connell [1979],
Krishnan [1990]). The model is able to speak to this issue. It predicts that, relative to multiple
jobholders, single jobholders are more likely to be dissatisfied with the number of hours they
work. Moreover, multiple jobholders who would like to work more hours would prefer to do so
on their second job, as this job is likely to have a high hourly wage rate (an endogenous model
outcome). Last, the model is ambivalent (depending on the Frisch labor supply elasticity) on
whether workers who are dissatisfied with their hours would like to work more vs. fewer hours.
It seems that the data is equivocal too, although according to Kahn and Lang [2001] most
workers in the United States would prefer to work more, not fewer, hours.
Our paper contributes to three strands of literature. First and foremost, we substantially
expand existing research on working hours and multiple jobholding. In early work by Shishko
and Rostker [1976], O’Connell [1979] and Krishnan [1990], the authors rely on simple static
labor-supply models to guide their empirical investigations. More recent studies by Oaxaca
and Renna [2006] and Hlouskova et al. [2017] also use static labor-supply models to organize
thinking about "job portfolios". Paxson and Sicherman [1996] construct a partial-equilibrium
dynamic model, but they do not study its implications quantitatively, and their main results
are based on empirical data. As far as we are aware, our paper is the first to offer a full-
fledged dynamic model of multiple jobholding cast in a general equilibrium setting.4,5 Hours
constraints, which are intimately related to the study of multiple jobholding, have been the topic
of a large literature (see Conway and Kimmel [1998] and Johnson [2011], and the references
cited in the opening paragraph). As will be illustrated below, the theory we propose is also
relevant to study this relationship. Second, beyond the applications proposed in the paper,
our model can be used to analyze flexible work arrangements such are those brought about by
4From a purely formal point of view, the work closest to ours is Guler et al. [2012]. The authors offer an
in-depth study of a search model of a household formed by a couple. In a subsection of their paper, they note
resemblances with a search model with a single agent who would be able to hold two jobs at the same time.
They do not push this analogy further, as their focus is to understand the reservation-wage behavior of the
household under assumptions on risk preferences or on job offers being from multiple locations. Besides this,
there are many important differences between Guler et al. [2012] and this paper: inter alia, they have a partial
equilibrium model with exogenous wage-offer distributions and do not consider hours worked.
5Here we cite only the references on multiple jobholding that develop a formal theoretical model. The
literature also includes numerous empirical studies that are useful for understanding the determinants of multiple
jobholding; e.g. Kimmel and Powell [1999], Conway and Kimmel [2001] and Panos et al. [2014].
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the rise of the "gig" economy (Jackson et al. [2017], Katz and Krueger [2019]). In particular,
the model yields predictions about workers’ valuation of nonstandard work arrangements and
provides a structural framework for studying elasticities at low vs. highly flexible working
hours. This heterogeneity in labor supply elasticities, revealed and studied in experimental
data, is currently a highly researched topic (Angrist et al. [2017], Mas and Pallais [2017]). Last,
the paper is related to the much-debated decline in dynamism of the U.S. labor market. This
debate focuses on the large decreases in job creation and destruction rates, in unemployment
outflows, in the job-separation rate, and in multiple jobholding as well as job-to-job transitions
(Hyatt and Spletzer [2013] and Molloy et al. [2016]). The literature devoted to this topic, cited
in Sections 2 and 6, is primarily empirical. Our contribution to this research is to study the
changing dynamism of the labor market through the lens of a theoretical, quantitative model.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lists a series of empirical facts to contextualize
this study. Sections 3 and 4 describe, respectively, the model and its equilibrium. Section 5
proceeds with the calibration of the model. Section 6 contains the main numerical experiments
and a discussion of the results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Stylized Facts
The empirical facts listed in this section are based on Paxson and Sicherman [1996], Lalé [2015],
Hirsch et al. [2016, 2017], and Appendix B of this paper. Prior to presenting these facts, we
must explain how multiple jobholding is defined and measured empirically. According to the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, multiple jobholders are those individuals who hold more than
one job during some reference period (for instance the reference week of the Current Population
Survey) and who usually receive a wage or salary from the primary job. The vast majority of
them (over 90 percent) hold only two jobs. A key related definition is that of the "primary"
job, which is the job with the greatest number of hours worked during the reference period.
The first set of facts relates to the allocation of time to market activities and to workers’
main stated reasons for holding more than one job:
1. In the cross section, multiple jobholders account for 5 to 6 percent of total employment.
The reason why this number is not higher is that most workers hold a second job for only
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a short period of time (typically less than 3 months).
2. Single jobholders face a significant probability of taking on a second job. As a result,
when following a worker over her whole working lifetime, there is close to a 50 percent
chance that she becomes a multiple jobholder at some point.
3. The typical multiple jobholder works full-time on her primary job and part-time on her
second job. Workers who combine two part-time jobs to make a full-time income only
account for 20 to 25 percent of all multiple jobholders.
4. The main stated reason for taking on a second job is to "earn extra money" (almost 40
percent), followed by "meeting expenses or paying off debt" (about 25 percent).
The next set of facts relates to the characteristics of multiple jobholders. In particular, Fact
6 ("multiple jobholding is positively correlated with education") provides further motivation
for focusing on a model with wage bargaining, given that more educated individuals are more
likely to hold jobs where wages are set through bargaining (Hall and Krueger [2012]):
5. The employment share of multiple jobholders (a quantity that we call the multiple jobhold-
ing share) is similar across male and female workers, across married and single individuals,
and across young, prime-age, and older individuals.
6. Multiple jobholding shares vary with education; they are much higher among more ed-
ucated individuals. Relatedly, multiple jobholding shares are higher among individuals
whose primary job is in professional and service occupations. A likely explanation for
this is the greater flexibility of the work schedule afforded by these occupations.
7. The other key variable accounting for large variations in multiple jobholding shares is labor
market size—in other words, multiple jobholding decreases with market size. This feature
is likely related to certain types of traffic congestion, such as time spent in commute-to-
work trips.
The last set of empirical facts pertains to the behavior of multiple jobholding over time:
8. There is little correlation between multiple jobholding and the business cycle. This could
be due to the weak cyclicality of the factors that push individuals toward and away from
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working multiple jobs. Alternatively, it could be that these factors are strongly cyclical
but are of similar magnitude and balance the effects of each other out.
9. The main time variation is that the employment share of multiple jobholders has de-
creased over the past 20 to 25 years.6 This decline is broad-based: it affects all groups
of individuals—men and women, lower-skilled and high-skilled workers, etc. The decline
has been more pronounced among men than among women.
10. The primary factor explaining the decline of multiple jobholding is the change in the
probability of taking on a second job. Conditional on being a multiple jobholder (though
without controlling for self-selection into multiple jobholding), it does not seem that
workers have become more likely to give up the second job.
Facts 9 and 10 have raised concerns that these might be symptoms of a less dynamic labor
market. They also echo findings that workers are shifting away from allocating hours to market
work (see Aguiar and Hurst [2007] and Ramey and Francis [2009]), and they bear out the
discussion provided at the end of Subsection 6.3). What is more, Fact 10 is suggestive of
some of the likely driving forces. It seems to run counter to a demand-side explanation based
on the decline of short-term jobs (e.g., single-quarter jobs such as those studied by Hyatt
and Spletzer [2017]), but it dovetails with the decline in U.S. worker mobility that has been
documented in other areas. In particular, the decline of multiple jobholding goes hand-in-hand
with the fall in job-to-job transitions that took place in the 2000s. The latter phenomenon
has attracted considerable attention and is an oft-cited symptom of declining labor market
dynamism (Bjelland et al. [2011], Hyatt and McEntarfer [2012] , Hyatt and Spletzer [2013]).
In the next sections, we set out a model that provides a framework for understanding some
of these stylized facts.
6It seems that this time trend is not specific to the U.S. labor market. In Canada, multiple jobholding
shares have come to a halt after being on an upward course that started in the 1970s. In the United Kingdom,
the multiple jobholding share has decreased over the past 15 to 20 years. The evolution is different in Germany,
where multiple jobholding has increased. As far as we are aware, this pattern has been entirely driven by the
tax incentives generated by the German "mini-job" reform.
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3 The Economy
Time t = 0, 1, . . . is discrete and runs forever. The economy is populated by a unit continuum
of workers and by an endogenous measure of employers, both of whom are infinitely lived and
discount the future at rate β−1 − 1.
Workers derive utility from market and nonmarket consumptions. They seek to maximize
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt (cmt + c
n
t ) . (1)
Market consumption, cmt , consists of labor earnings net of a fixed cost of working ωj, which is
incurred for each job that the individual works. The number of jobs held is capped at two,
meaning that j ∈ {1, 2}. Workers are endowed with one unit of time per period, and ht denotes
hours allocated to market work. Nonmarket consumption, cnt , consists of a home-produced
good. The production of the home good depends on productivity in the home sector, zt, which
is idiosyncratic to the worker, and on the nonmarket hours of the worker, 1− ht. Specifically,
the production function of the home good is ztg (1− ht), where g (·) has the standard form
g (1− ht) = (1− ht)
1− 1
γ − 1
1− 1
γ
. (2)
Idiosyncratic home productivity zt evolves over time according to a persistent stochastic process
with transition function G, i.e. G (z′|z) = Pr {zt+1 < z′|zt = z}.7
The objective of employers is to maximize the expected present value of profit streams pit:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtpit. (3)
Each employer has at most one job that is either filled or vacant. A vacant job costs the
employer κ units of output per period. A filled job produces a flow of output ytf (ht), where yt
denotes idiosyncratic match productivity. f (·) is the function that maps hours worked ht onto
7Lalé [2018] makes similar assumptions (viz. stochastic shocks to workers’ preferences over leisure) in a
model with an operative participation margin that produces worker flows in and out of the labor force.
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labor services. We assume the following, non–convex mapping:8
f (ht) =

(1− ψ)ht if ht < h¯
(1− ψ)ht + ψ if ht ≥ h¯
. (4)
ψ ≥ 0 and h¯ ≥ 0 are exogenous parameters. The role of ψ is to "bunch" the hours of work of
agents towards h¯. Match productivity yt is stochastic and exhibits some persistence over time.
Its transition function is denoted as F . Employers enter the labor market until the value of
holding a vacant job equals zero.
Workers and employers come together via search. The number of contacts per unit of time
depends on the number of vacancies and number of job seekers. This relationship is governed by
a constant-returns-to-scale function, meaning that the job-filling probability depends only on
labor market tightness θt—i.e., the ratio between vacancies and job seekers. Both nonemployed
workers and single jobholders search for jobs. Multiple jobholders, on the other hand, must give
up either one or both jobs to start receiving job offers. The probabilities that a nonemployed
worker and a single jobholder meet an employer with a vacant job are, respectively,
λ0,t = θtq (θt) and λ1,t = seλ0,t. (5)
se measures the relative efficiency of on-the-job search. On meeting, match productivity yt is
sampled from a distribution denoted as F0. After observing the initial yt, the worker and the
employer either walk away from each other or stay together.
We need certain model assumptions in order to accommodate the option of holding more
than one job and operationalize key notions related to multiple jobholding:
(A1) On receiving an outside job offer, the worker is allowed to either move to the new employer
(job-to-job transition), combine the new job with her current job (multiple jobholding),
or discard these two options.
(A2) If the worker chooses multiple jobholding, she must commit to staying with her old
employer – henceforth the primary employer – until the primary job is no longer viable,
8Prescott et al. [2009], Rogerson and Wallenius [2009] and Chang et al. [2019] rely on a non-convex mapping
from hours to labor services in order to distinguish the extensive and intensive margins of labor supply. We
build on this idea to generate a meaningful distinction between part-time and full-time employment.
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but she may choose to give up the second job at any time.
(A3) The multiple jobholder uses the primary job as her outside option when she bargains with
the new employer – henceforth the secondary employer.
Anticipating on Section 4, we have mentioned worker-firm bargaining in the assumptions above.
Let us make a few remarks to complement these assumptions. First, bargaining will be set up so
that the participation constraints are satisfied on both employers’ sides. Second, it is assumed
that if the worker makes a job-to-job transition, she loses contact with the former employer,
and therefore cannot use her previous employment status to bargain for a higher wage at the
new employer. Third, in addition to the timing assumptions, we will assume that workers
and firms continually rebargain, so that there is no role for wages to reduce worker quitting.
Fourth, if the worker discards the option of moving to the new employer, then her bargaining
position remains unchanged at the current employer. In particular, she cannot increase her
wage at the primary employer by holding a second job, meaning that we preclude the worker
from exploiting a bargaining opportunity. Fifth, we exclude the possibility for the secondary
employer of inducing a quit by paying the worker a wage bonus. This arrangement is ruled
out at the time of meeting the worker and in future periods, as the secondary employer must
recognize that the worker is committed to her primary employer.
4 Equilibrium
4.1 Asset values and joint match surplus
In order to describe the behavior of workers who populate this economy, we denote by N (z),
E (y1, z) and E (y1, y2, z) the asset values of, respectively, nonemployed individuals, single job-
holders, and multiple jobholders. For firms, we use J (y1, z) to denote the asset value of an
employer matched to a single jobholder. For those matched to a multiple jobholder, we de-
note by J1 (y1, y2, z) and J2 (y1, y2, z) the asset values of the primary and secondary employers,
respectively. The asset value of holding a vacancy is always zero.
There are two joint match surpluses that need to be defined. The first one is the match
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surplus of employment with a single jobholder, S (y1, z). It is given by
S (y1, z) = J (y1, z) + E (y1, z)−N (z) . (6)
Next, the assumptions laid out in Section 3 imply that the surplus of employment with a
multiple jobholder, denoted as S (y1, y2, z), is
S (y1, y2, z) = J2 (y1, y2, z) + E (y1, y2, z)− E (y1, z) . (7)
That is, the surplus of multiple jobholding consists of the surplus of the secondary employer
and the worker’s asset value of holding two jobs, net of the value of working only on her primary
job. Notice that J1 (y1, y2, z) does not appear in the system of equations (6) and (7).
4.2 Bargaining
We assume that workers and employers Nash-bargain on wages period by period to split the
surplus. Letting φ ∈ (0, 1) denote the bargaining power of workers, we have
(1− φ) (E (y1, z)−N (z)) = φJ (y1, z) (8)
and
(1− φ) (E (y1, y2, z)− E (y1, z)) = φJ2 (y1, y2, z) . (9)
These equations hold at an interior solution, noting that the surpluses on each side must be
nonnegative. In addition, Equation (9) is subject to the condition that J (y1, z) be nonnega-
tive to ensure participation from the primary employer. The wage schedules associated with
Equations (8) and (9) are denoted as w (y1, z) and w (y1, y2, z), respectively.
Working hours are also set through bargaining. In contrast to wages, which address the
dynamic aspect of the relationships between employers and workers, hours are pinned down by
static conditions: they equalize marginal productivity in the market and the home sector. There
is a discontinuity in the mapping between match productivity and hours worked coming from
the specification of f (·) (Equation (4)). That is, when the productivity of a single jobholder
in the home sector is z, the worker-firm pair is better off holding hours worked at h¯ for values
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of match productivity y1 between yh¯ (z) and y˜ (z), where yh¯ (z) is implicitly defined by
yh¯ (z) f (h (yh¯ (z) , z)) + zg (1− h (yh¯ (z) , z)) = yh¯ (z) f
(
h¯
)
+ zg
(
1− h¯) . (10)
Let y˜ (z) denote the level of match productivity so that h¯ coincides with 1 −
(
z
(1−ψ)y1
)γ
, the
optimal hours schedule of the worker-firm pair when the discontinuity of the function f (·) is
not binding. We have:
y˜ (z) =
z
(
1− h¯)− 1γ
1− ψ . (11)
Putting it all together, the hours schedule of single jobholders is given by9
h (y1, z) =

h¯ if yh¯ (z) ≤ y1 < y˜ (z)
1−
(
z
(1−ψ)y1
)γ
otherwise
(12)
for all positive y1 and z. Next, consider the second job of a multiple jobholder. We define
likewise a cutoff yh¯ (y1, z) which satisfies
yh¯ (y1, z) f (h (y1, yh¯ (y1, z) , z)) + zg (1− h (y1, z)− h (y1, yh¯ (y1, z) , z))
= yh¯ (y1, z) f
(
h¯
)
+ zg
(
1− h (y1, z)− h¯
)
. (13)
Observe that 1−h (y1, z) gives an upper bound on the hours that can be allocated to the second
job. By this token, the upper threshold y˜ (y1, z) is given by
y˜ (y1, z) =
z
(
1− h (y1, z)− h¯
)− 1
γ
1− ψ . (14)
The thresholds described by Equations (13) and (14) yield the following hours schedule for the
second job of multiple jobholders:
h (y1, y2, z) =

h¯ if yh¯ (y1, z) ≤ y2 < y˜ (y1, z)
1− h (y1, z)−
(
z
(1−ψ)y2
)γ
otherwise
(15)
9If y1 ≤ 0, then it is optimal for the worker-firm pair to set h (y1, z) = 0. Likewise in Equation (15), it is
optimal to set h (y1, y2, z) = 0 if y2 ≤ 0 (since the flow of output on the second job is y2f (h (y1, y2, z))).
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defined for all positive y1, y2, and z.
4.3 Bellman equations10
To write the Bellman equations, we need to first define the relevant policy functions. As
we show momentarily, we can focus on the following three functions that correspond to bi-
nary decisions: 1) an employer’s decision to keep a job alive, p (y1, z) = 1 {J (y1, z) ≥ 0}; 2)
a worker’s decision to take on a second job, d (y1, y2, z) = 1 {E (y1, y2, z) ≥ E (y1, z)}; and 3)
a worker’s decision to leave the current job upon meeting an incumbent employer, ` (y1, y2, z) =
1 {max {E (y2, z) , N (z)} ≥ max {E (y1, z) , E (y1, z) + p (y1, z) (E (y1, y2, z)− E (y1, z)) , N (z)}}.
Observe that inside the "max" operator p (y1, z) multiplies E (y1, y2, z)−E (y1, z) as per assump-
tion (A3): the option of having a second job holds as long as the first job is viable. Proposition
1 will prove very useful to characterize the equilibrium:
Proposition 1. Under Nash bargaining, the policy functions p (y1, z), d (y1, y2, z), ` (y1, y2, z)
can be expressed jointly as functions of the match surpluses S (y1, z), S (y1, y2, z). Specifically,
p (y1, z) = 1 {S (y1, z) ≥ 0} (16)
d (y1, y2, z) = 1 {S (y1, y2, z) ≥ 0} (17)
` (y1, y2, z) = 1 {p (y2, z)S (y2, z) ≥ p (y1, z) (S (y1, z) + d (y1, y2, z)S (y1, y2, z))} (18)
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
With these policy functions at hand, we are in a position to write the system of Bellman
equations. There are three asset values that matter in the economy’s equilibrium: S (y1, z),
S (y1, y2, z), and J1 (y1, y2, z). To simplify notations, we also include N (z), the value of being
nonemployed, in the system of equations below. N (z) solves
N (z) = β
ˆ (
N (z′) + λ0φ
ˆ
p (y′1, z
′)S (y′1, z
′) dF0 (y′1)
)
dG (z′|z) . (19)
10In this section, we focus on the Bellman equations for S (y1, z), S (y1, y2, z), and J1 (y1y2, z), because these
asset values are sufficient to describe the equilibrium of the model. S (y1, z) and S (y1, y2, z) are derived from
the Bellman equations that define N (z), E (y1, z), E (y1, y2, z), J (y1, z), J1 (y1, y2, z), J2 (y1, y2, z) through
calculations presented in Appendix A.2.
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The continuation value of nonemployment includes the surplus of becoming a single jobholder
multiplied by the worker’s bargaining power.
The joint surplus of employment with a single jobholder is
S (y1, z) = y1f (h (y1, z)) + zg (1− h (y1, z))− (N (z) + ω1) + β
(
S+e (y1, z) + S
+
j (y1, z)
+
ˆ (ˆ
p (y′1, z
′)
(
1− λ1
ˆ
` (y′1, y
′
2, z
′) dF0 (y′2)
)
S (y′1, z
′)
)
dF (y′1|y1)
)
dG (z′|z)
)
(20)
where
S+e (y1, z) =
ˆ (
N (z′) + φλ1
ˆ ˆ
(` (y′1, y
′
2, z
′) p (y′2, z
′)S (y′2, z
′) + (1− ` (y′1, y′2, z′))
× p (y′1, z′) d (y′1, y′2, z′)S (y′1, y′2, z′)) dF0 (y′2) dF (y′1|y1)
)
dG (z′|z) (21)
and
S+j (y1, z) = λ1
ˆ ˆ ˆ
((1− ` (y′1, y′2, z′)) p (y′1, z′) d (y′1, y′2, z′) (J1 (y′1, y′2, z′)
− (1− φ)S (y′1, z′))) dF0 (y′2) dF (y′1|y1) dG (z′|z) . (22)
There are three components in the continuation value of a match with a single jobholder. The
first one is the worker’s component S+e (y1, z) defined in Equation (21), which captures the
option that a single job might allow the worker to switch employer or take on a second job in
the future. Second, the employer’s component S+j (y1, z) shown in Equation (22) measures the
fact that, if the worker takes on a second job, then the incumbent firm becomes the primary
employer, the net surplus of which is J1 (y1, y2, z)−(1− φ)S (y1, z). Third, if the worker neither
leaves nor becomes a multiple jobholder, then in Equation (20) the worker-firm pair receives
the surplus S (y1, z) in the subsequent period if the job is kept alive.
Next, consider the match surplus between a secondary employer and a multiple jobholder,
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S (y1, y2, z). Its asset value is given by
S (y1, y2, z) = y2f (h (y1, y2, z)) + zg (1− h (y1, z)− h (y1, y2, z))− ω2
− (φS (y1, z) +N (z) + ω1 − w (y1, z)) + β
(
S+e (y1, y2, z) +
ˆ (ˆ ˆ
p (y′1, z
′)
× d (y′1, y′2, z′)S (y′1, y′2, z′) dF (y′1|y1) dF (y′2|y2)
+
(ˆ
(1− p (y′1, z′)) dF (y′1|y1)
)(ˆ
p (y′2, z
′)S (y′2, z
′) dF (y′2|y2)
))
dG (z′|z)
)
(23)
where
S+e (y1, y2, z) =
ˆ (
N (z′) + φ
ˆ
p (y′1, z
′)S (y′1, z
′) dF (y′1|y1)
)
dG (z′|z) . (24)
In the continuation value of S (y1, y2, z), S+e (y1, y2, z), defined in Equation (24) captures the
option value of the worker who might return to her primary employer should the spell of
multiple jobholding come to an end. The remaining part in Equation (23) shows that the
employment relationship might continue as a spell of multiple jobholding or be transformed
into single employment at the secondary employer (who would then become the sole employer
of the worker).
Last, the asset value of being the primary employer of a multiple jobholder solves
J1 (y1, y2, z) = y1f (h (y1, z))− w (y1, z) + β
ˆ ˆ
p (y′1, z
′)
(
(1− φ)S (y′1, z′) +
ˆ
(d (y′1, y
′
2, z
′)
× (J1 (y′1, y′2, z′)− (1− φ)S (y′1, z′)) dF (y′2|y2)
)
dF (y′1|y1) dG (z′|z) . (25)
That is, in the subsequent period the employer might become the only employer of the worker
if the worker gives up her second job. Otherwise, she will continue as her primary employer
and receive the net surplus value J1 (y1, y2, z)− (1− φ)S (y1, z).
It is useful to note similarities and differences between J1 (y1, y2, z) and (1− φ)S (y1, z) =
J (y1, z). First, the profit flows y1f (h (y1, z)) − w (y1, z) are the same because the wage and
hours of a multiple jobholder at her primary employer are unaffected by the second job. Second,
in the continuation value of J1 (y1, y2, z), (1− φ)S (y1, z) is only subjected to the condition
p (y1, z) = 1 (i.e., the job remains viable), whereas in the continuation value of J (y1, z) this is
also multiplied by 1−λ1 +λ1 (1− ` (y1, y2, z)) < 1. That is, a multiple jobholder holds onto her
primary employer, and therefore she is less mobile than a single jobholder. Third, and related,
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J1 (y1, y2, z)−(1− φ)S (y1, z) in Equation (25) is multiplied by d (y1, y2, z) p (y1, z) = 1 whereas
in the continuation value of J (y1, z) it is also multiplied by λ1 (1− ` (y1, y2, z)) < 1. The other
difference here is that y′2 is drawn from the transition function F (y′2|y2) in the continuation
value of J1 (y1, y2, z), while it is drawn from F0 in the calculation of J (y1, z). Since the second
job must be sufficiently productive to be operated under the hours schedule h (y1, y2, z), it is
likely that F (y′2|.) dominates F0 (.) (in a first-order stochastic sense) for the range of relevant
values of y2. Putting it all together, we expect J1 (y1, y2, z)− (1− φ)S (y1, z) to be positive for
those values of y2 such that a worker with current state variables y1 and z chooses to hold a
second job.
In order to compute the joint surplus value of multiple jobholding (Equation (23)), we need
to determine the wage of a single jobholder, w (y1, z). From the asset value of employing a
single jobholder, it follows that
w (y1, z) = y1f (h (y1, z))− (1− φ)S (y1, z) + β
(
S+j (y1, z) + (1− φ)
×
ˆ (ˆ
p (y′1, z
′)
(
1− λ1
ˆ
` (y′1, y
′
2, z
′) dF0 (y′2)
)
S (y′1, z
′)
)
dF (y′1|y1)
)
dG (z′|z)
)
(26)
for all y1 and z. It is also straightforward to recover w (y1, y2, z), the wage of a multiple
jobholder, using the asset value of secondary employers. w (y1, y2, z) is given by
w (y1, y2, z) = y2f (h (y1, y2, z))− (1− φ)S (y1, y2, z) + β (1− φ)
ˆ (ˆ ˆ
p (y′1, z
′)
× d (y′1, y′2, z′)S (y′1, y′2, z′) dF (y′1|y1) dF (y′2|y2)
+
(ˆ
(1− p (y′1, z′)) dF (y′1|y1)
)(ˆ
p (y′2, z
′)S (y′2, z
′) dF (y′2|y2)
))
dG (z′|z) (27)
for all y1, y2 and z.
4.4 Free entry condition
To write the free entry condition, we let ϕ0 (z) and ϕ1 (y1, z) denote the population measure of
nonemployed workers and single jobholders, respectively. Below we will denote by ϕ2 (y1, y2, z)
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the population measure of multiple jobholders. The free entry condition yields
κ
q (θ)
= β (1− φ)
(ˆ ˆ
p (y′1, z
′)S (y′1, z
′) dF0 (y′1) dG (z
′|z) ϕ0 (z)
ϕ¯0 + seϕ¯1
dz
+
ˆ ˆ ˆ
S+j (y
′
1, y
′
2, z
′) dF0 (y′2) dF (y
′
1|y1) dG (z′|z)
seϕ1 (y1, z)
ϕ¯0 + seϕ¯1
dy1dz
)
(28)
where
S+j (y1, y2, z) = ` (y1, y2, z) p (y2, z)S (y2, z)
+ (1− ` (y1, y2, z)) p (y1, z) d (y1, y2, z)S (y1, y2, z) . (29)
(1− φ)S+j (y1, y2, z) is the asset value of an employer with a vacant position who meets an
employed worker: she takes as given the decision of the worker to leave the previous employer or
to piece together the two jobs. In Equation (28), ϕ¯0 is the cumulated measure of nonemployed
workers, i.e. ϕ¯0 =
´
ϕ0 (z) dz. Likewise, ϕ¯1 is the cumulated measure of single jobholders.
ϕ¯0 + seϕ¯1 gives the number of job seekers, which is used to obtain the relevant conditional
distribution on the right-hand side of equation (28).
4.5 Equilibrium
We define a steady-state equilibrium of the economy as follows:
Definition. A steady-state equilibrium is a list of asset values N (z), E (y1, z), E (y1, y2, z),
J (y1, z), J1 (y1, y2, z), J2 (y1, y2, z); a list of wage schedules w (y1, z), w (y1, y2, z) and schedules
of hours worked h (y1, z), h (y1, y2, z); a list of policy functions for match formation and contin-
uation, p (y1, z), multiple jobholding d (y1, y2, z) and leave decisions ` (y1, y2, z); a population
distribution ϕ0 (z), ϕ1 (y1, z), ϕ2 (y1, y2, z); and a value of tightness θ such that:
1. Given wages w (y1, z), w (y1, y2, z) and schedules of hours h (y1, z), h (y1, y2, z), the pol-
icy functions p (y1, z), d (y1, y2, z), ` (y1, y2, z), and tightness θ, the asset values N (z),
E (y1, z), E (y1, y2, z), J (y1, z), J1 (y1, y2, z), J2 (y1, y2, z) solve the Bellman equations
that add up to (20), (23) and (25) through the surplus sharing Equations (8) and (9).
2. Given the asset values N (z), E (y1, z), E (y1, y2, z), J (y1, z), J1 (y1, y2, z), J2 (y1, y2, z),
and tightness θ, the wage schedules w (y1, z), w (y1, y2, z) yield the surplus sharing Equa-
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tions (8) and (9), and the schedules of hours worked h (y1, z), h (y1, y2, z) are given by
Equations (12) and (15).
3. Given the asset values N (z), E (y1, z), E (y1, y2, z), J (y1, z), J2 (y1, y2, z) combined into
joint surpluses through Equations (6) and (7), the policy functions p (y1, z), d (y1, y2, z),
` (y1, y2, z) are given by Equations (16), (17) and (18), respectively.
4. Given the policy functions p (y1, z), d (y1, y2, z), ` (y1, y2, z), and tightness θ, the popula-
tion distribution ϕ0 (z), ϕ1 (y1, z), ϕ2 (y1, y2, z) is time invariant with respect to the set of
stock-flow equations of the economy.
5. Given the asset values J (y1, z) and J2 (y1, y2, z) combined into joint match surpluses
through Equations (8) and (9), and population distribution ϕ0 (z), ϕ1 (y1, z), labor-market
tightness θ solves Equation (28).
The stock-flow equations across the different states of nature (condition 4 in the above defi-
nition) can be deduced from the model’s description. Given a population distribution ϕ0 (z),
ϕ1 (y1, z), ϕ2 (y1, y2, z) and a value of market tightness θ, Proposition 1 enables us to com-
pute the equilibrium by solving Equations (20), (23), (25) (for instance using value-function
iterations) while recovering the wage schedule w (y1, z) using Equation (26).
5 Calibration and Validation
In this section, we proceed with the model’s calibration and validate it by comparing a set of
model-generated moments against their empirical counterparts. The calculation of several key
data moments is based on the empirical framework presented in Appendix B.
Specification and calibration. We need a number of preliminary specifications in order to
list the parameters of the model. As is standard, we assume that match productivity y evolves
according to a first-order autoregressive process. We denote by µy the unconditional mean of
the process, ρy ∈ (0, 1) the persistence, and let σ2ε denote the variance of the innovation term.
We must also specify F0, the distribution from which y is drawn upon meeting. For simplicity
we assume that F0 (·) = F (·|µy). Next, we need to specify the stochastic process of home
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productivity, z. We use a first-order Markov process defined in the following way: the value
of z remains unchanged with probability ρz, while with probability 1 − ρz a new value z′ is
drawn from a Normal distribution with mean µz and variance σ2z , truncated to the interval
[µz − 2σz, µz + 2σz].11 Last, we assume a standard Cobb-Douglas matching function so that
the job-filling probability is q (θ) = χθ−α.
Under these specification choices, the number of model parameters is seventeen: γ, β, h¯,
µy, ρy, α, φ, χ, ρz, µz, σz, ψ, κ, σε, se, ω1, ω2. The first one of this list is the curvature
parameter γ that regulates the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.12 As is well known, the value
of this elasticity is subject to controversies in the literature. Microeconometric studies of panel
data find that the elasticity is rather low—i.e., not higher than 0.40 and in many instances
not even higher than 0.20. In light of this evidence we consider a Frisch elasticity of 0.30.
Macroeconomic studies, on the other hand, often rely on a much higher value of this elasticity.
We think studying the implications of a larger Frisch elasticity is interesting in its own rights,
and so we also consider an elasticity that is twice the baseline value (0.60). With a slight abuse
of language, we will refer to 0.30 and 0.60 as low and high values of the Frisch elasticity. We use
external information to select parameter values for β, h¯, µy, ρy, α, φ, χ, which are held constant
across the different calibrations. The remaining parameters (thus corresponding to a specific
value of γ) are calibrated to match several data moments that we discuss below. Throughout
the analysis, the model period is set to be one month.
We choose a discount factor β of 0.9951 to accord with an annualized real interest rate of
6 percent. We set h¯ = 0.40 given that the time endowment of workers has been normalized to
1. That is, there are about 100 hours of substitutable time per week, and so we can interpret
working h¯ hours as the 40 hours workweek. The model allows for one more normalization,
namely the unconditional mean of match productivity, µy. We set its value equal to 1. Next,
observe that both ρy and ρz are related to the persistence of wages, which suggests fixing one
of these two parameters. The most common of them is the persistence of match productivity,
ρy. This parameter is usually set to a high value based on the observation that wage shocks
are approximately unit root process. Thus we choose ρy = 0.975. As is conventional in the
literature, we set the elasticity of the vacancy-filling probability with respect to labor market
11Notice that Equations (12) and (15) require that z be nonnegative. It turns out that this condition is
always satisfied, as the calibrated parameter values are such that µz − 2σz > 0.
12Under the preferences that we have assumed, the Frisch elasticity of labor supply is γ 1−htht .
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tightness α and the bargaining power of workers φ equal to 0.5. Finally, we fix the matching
efficiency parameter χ to 0.50, as we calibrate the vacancy-posting cost below to match a
specific data moment.
Separately for each gender group, we calibrate the remaining parameters, namely ρz, µz,
σz, ψ, κ, σε, se, ω1, ω2, to match nine data moments. These moments are:
1–4. The probability that a single jobholder moves from full-time to part-time work; the part-
time employment share (i.e., the share of employed workers whose total number of hours
worked is strictly under h¯ hours); average hours per worker; the share of employed workers
bunching at 40 hours per week (h¯ hours in the model). For these data moments, we
calculate averages over the years 1994 to 2018 of the corresponding time series analyzed
in Borowczyk-Martins and Lalé [2019].
5. The cost of job creation. We follow Elsby and Michaels [2013] and calibrate κ so that the
expected job creation cost (κ/q(θ)) amounts to 14 percent of average quarterly earnings.13
6. The job separation rate. In the model, this data moment is mostly related to the variance
of idiosyncratic shocks to match productivity. To avoid obtaining very different values
of this technology parameter, we target the same data moment for both gender groups
(both for low and high values of the Frisch elasticity), namely a job separation rate of 2.5
percent per month as in Bils et al. [2011].
7. The job-to-job transition rate. We calculate the average over the years 1994 to 2018 of
the job-to-job transition probabilities displayed in Figure 2.
8. The job-finding rate. As in Bils et al. [2011], we target a monthly job-finding rate of 31.3
percent. This value provides a reasonable compromise between treating nonemployment
as the sum of unemployment and nonparticipation together vs. identifying nonemploy-
ment as unemployment only.
9. The employment share of multiple jobholders. We calculate the average over the years
1994 to 2018 of the multiple jobholding time series displayed in Figure 2.
13Elsby and Michaels [2013] use empirical evidence based on Silva and Toledo [2009] to calculate this number.
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Observe that since the model-generated are determined jointly, the calibrated parameter values
of ρz, µz, σz, ψ, κ, σε, se, ω1, ω2 are also jointly set. Yet each parameter turns out to be
closely related to a specific data moment targeted by our calibration exercise. To highlight this
mapping, we use the same number to list each of these parameters in the first column of Table
1 and the data moment that best identifies it in Table 2. For instance, the persistence of home
productivity ρz is most directly related to transitions from full-time to part-time work among
single jobholders (rows labeled 1 in Tables 1 and 2). In all tables of the paper, the columns
labeled L and H denote calibrations based, respectively, on low and high Frisch elasticities. For
men, the corresponding values of the curvature parameter γ are 0.229 and 0.458. For women,
the values of γ are 0.181 and 0.362.
[Table 1 about here.]
Validation of the model. The upper panel of Table 2 compares targeted data moments to
their model-generated counterparts. As can be seen, the model matches the data well. The fit
is very satisfactory with respect to transitions to and from employment, and the model captures
well the gender difference in the incidence of part-time employment. For women, the model
slightly overestimates the probability of moving from full-time to part-time work among single
jobholders.14 For both gender groups, it predicts job-to-job transitions and multiple jobholding
precisely. What is more, the model performs well at capturing all the inflows and outflows
of multiple jobholding (lower panel of Table 2). First, it consistently predicts that multiple
jobholding is more prevalent among individuals who are working part-time as opposed to full-
time on their primary job. That is, the inflow transition probability is about twice as high
for part-time workers as for full-time workers. The model slightly underpredicts the transition
probability of moving from multiple jobholding to single jobholding with a full-time primary job.
Yet it captures the fact that this transition probability is lower than the probability of moving
to single jobholding among multiple jobholders with a part-time primary job. Second, the
assumption that workers in the model cannot move directly from nonemployment to multiple
jobholding is in line with the data. In the reverse direction, the model generates some transitions
14In the calibration, we cap the persistence parameter at ρz at 0.995. As Table 1 shows, we hit this upper
bound for women regardless of the value of the Frisch elasticity. This leaves the model with no margin in which
to maneuver to make hours worked more persistent for women.
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directly from multiple jobholding to nonemployment, and the fit with respect to this data
moment is satisfactory.
[Table 2 about here.]
To illustrate further the workings of the model, in Figure 1 we plot two thresholds that play an
important role in the model’s equilibrium.15 The first one, y˜d (y1, z), satisfies E (y1, y˜d (y1, z) , z) =
E (y1, z). That is, it gives the lowest match productivity of the second job y2 such that the
worker chooses to become a multiple jobholder. The other threshold, y˜` (y1, z), is the value
of match productivity such that the worker moves to the new employer upon receiving an on-
the-job offer.16 From top to bottom, the plots correspond to different values of idiosyncratic
home productivity, z: z20 denotes the first quintile, z40 the second quintile, etc. Recall that the
timing is such that, on receiving an outside job offer, the worker first chooses whether or not to
move to the new employer, then decides whether or not she becomes a multiple jobholder. This
means that the area in between y˜d (y1, z) and y˜` (y1, z) in Figure 1 (or the area above y˜d (y1, z)
in regions where y˜d (y1, z) > y˜` (y1, z)) corresponds to values of y2 so that the worker chooses
to piece together two jobs. The fact that this area is so tight implies that a multiple jobholder
quickly returns to single jobholding. In line with this observation, we calculate that the average
duration of a second job is around 3.5 months, and that a large share of second jobs actually
end after only 1 month.17 From the employers’ perspective, these numbers imply that there is
substantial variance in expected job duration on meeting an employed worker.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Model outcomes. We continue our examination of the model’s outcomes in Table 3. The
first panel of the table compares the flow costs of working ω1 and ω2 to a worker’s average
15To avoid reporting the outcomes for different values of the curvature parameter γ, we calibrate two auxiliary
models (one for each gender group) that correspond to an intermediate value of the Frisch elasticity of 0.45.
The underlying values of γ are 0.344 for men and 0.271 for women. We use these models for the plots in Figure
1 and Figures 2 and 3 in Section 6.
16In each plot, y˜` (y1, z) clearly has two segments. The horizontal part corresponds to the job destruction
threshold. Although hard to discern, this threshold is slightly increasing with respect to z. The other segment
of y˜` (y1, z) is the 45 degree line, indicating that the worker chooses to move to the outside job if it has a value
of match productivity that is higher than that of her current job.
17The figures reported in Table 2 allow us to compute the expected duration of spells of multiple jobholding.
To calculate the duration using actual completed spells of multiple jobholding, we draw a large panel of agents
from the equilibrium cross-sectional distribution of multiple jobholders and we simulate their own labor market
trajectory over 36 months.
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earnings. Two results stand out. The first one is that ω1, which we calibrated to match
a specific data moment on the job-finding rate, is at most 40 percent of earnings. Thus, if
we compare it to the standard search model, this amounts to interpreting the flow value of
nonemployment as unemployment benefits. Second, on average, ω2 is worth 16 to 18 percent
of workers’ earnings. Unlike ω1, ω2 is not very sensitive to the value of the Frisch elasticity. In
our view, this suggests that the cost of working a second job can be substantial. For instance,
in Bils et al. [2012]’s calculations, the expenditure necessitated by work is 10 percent of average
earnings for high-wage workers and 27 percent of earnings for low-wage workers. Aguiar and
Hurst [2013] document that work-related expenses (clothing, food away from home, commute
to work, etc.) account for only a small fraction of total consumer spending. In our model
on the other hand, ω2 comes in addition to ω1 and so should represent a small portion of the
expenditure necessitated by work. Another way to put it is that our model suggests there is a
large nonmonetary cost of working a second job.
In the middle panel of Table 3, we study "hours constraints" through the lens of the model.
This examination is motivated by the focus of much of the literature on whether workers take
on second jobs to alleviate hours constraints that affect their primary job. Some labor force
surveys provide "direct" evidence on hours constraints: they ask, “If you had a choice, would
you prefer to work the same number of hours and earn the same money, fewer hours at the
same rate of pay and earn less money, or more hours at the same rate of pay and earn more
money?” (see Kahn and Lang [2001] for an overview).18 We can use our model to relate to this
question. The hours of market work that a single jobholder would prefer at her current pay
rate solve
max
h
{
w (y1, z)
h (y1, z)
h+ zg (1− h)
}
, (30)
and the first-order condition gives:
h∗ (y1, z) = 1−
(
zh (y1, z)
w (y1, z)
)γ
. (31)
Likewise, we can ask a multiple jobholder how many hours she would prefer to work on each
18This question is extracted from the supplements of the Current Population Survey. Kahn and Lang [2001]
point out the importance of question wording: one can get very different estimates if the question does not spell
out clearly that a change in hours would be accompanied by a proportional change in earnings.
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job given her current pay rates. To answer this question, this worker would solve
max
h1,h2
{
w (y1, z)
h (y1, z)
h1 +
w (y1, y2, z)
h (y1, y2, z)
h2 + zg (1− h1 − h2)
}
. (32)
We compare these preferred hours to agents’ actual hours worked. We deem a worker dissatisfied
with her hours if preferred hours differ from actual hours by at least 5 percent. The middle
panel of Table 3 presents results from these calculations. A large share (between 40 and 60
percent) of workers are dissatisfied with their hours. This dovetails with the evidence surveyed
by Kahn and Lang [2001].19 Although most dissatisfied workers would like to work fewer hours,
there is some variation here depending on the underlying distribution of z and Frisch elasticity
of labor supply. Multiple jobholders bring in additional pieces of information. First, they are
much less likely to want more hours than single jobholders do. Second, multiple jobholders who
would like to work more would typically choose to increase hours on the second job. This is
because the hourly wage of the second job is high, since workers are often unable to work many
hours on this job (see equation (15)). Third, and related, conditional on wanting to reduce
hours, multiple jobholders would prefer to work less on the first job.
[Table 3 about here.]
At the bottom of Table 3, we study the motives for returning from multiple to single jobhold-
ing.20 Almost 25 percent of these transitions occur because the first job is no longer viable,
meaning that the worker moves to the outside employer. Notice that this counts as a job-to-job
transition.21 The remaining three-quarters of these transitions are made up of two numbers.
In some instances (about 15 percent of the remaining cases), the worker gives up a second job
that, at that point, would not be viable even if it were matched to a single jobholder. That
19Kahn and Lang [2001] find a roughly similar estimate across five different survey for the United States:
more than 40 percent of individuals would like to change their hours. Also, with exception of one survey, they
find that most dissatisfied workers in the United States would like to work more, not fewer, hours. They report
that 60 percent of workers in Canada would like to change their hours and are evenly split between working
more and working less. In data for Europe, it appears that most dissatisfied workers would prefer to reduce
hours.
20As Table 2 indicates, in some rare instances the worker moves directly to nonemployment at the end of the
spell of multiple jobholding (viz. J (y1, z) and J (y2, z) are both negative). The bottom panel of Table 3 looks
at worker transitions that are conditional on staying employed.
21Unlike in the standard search model (e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides [1994]), the job destruction rate in this
model is different from, and higher than, the probability of moving from employment to nonemployment. One
job gets destroyed when a single jobholder moves to nonemployment or moves to a new employer, or when a
multiple jobholder returns to holding a single job, and two jobs are destroyed when a multiple jobholder moves
to nonemployment.
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is, J2 (y1, y2, z) (which is proportional to E (y1, y2, z) − E (y1, z)) and J (y2, z) are both nega-
tive. This is likely to occur when y2 suffers a large negative shock. But in most instances, the
worker gives up a second job that would actually generate a positive surplus if operated by a
single jobholder; the "counterfactual" value J (y2, z) is positive. To understand these figures,
recall that workers take on a second job when y2 is in between y˜d (y1, z) and y˜` (y1, z) in Figure
1 (as match productivity is initially drawn from the distribution F0 that is centered at µy).
Therefore, in most spells of multiple jobholding, we have J (y2, z) > J2 (y1, y2, z) ≥ 0.22
6 Numerical Experiments
We now turn to the main applications of the model. We use it to address two broad questions:
1) how search frictions affect the decision to become a multiple jobholder, and in turn, 2) how
multiple jobholding contributes to aggregate search frictions.
We answer these questions in the context of the joint dynamics of job-to-job transitions
and multiple jobholding over the period from the mid-1990s until today. Figure 2 shows that
they have both decreased substantially over time. The dotted lines denote the model counter-
parts that are obtained by calibrating se and ω2 to match the average of the time series for
every year in between 1995 and 2015.23,24 We will use these calibrated value to analyze the
relationships between search frictions and multiple jobholding. Before doing so, in Figure 3
we plot the model-generated time series of multiple jobholding inflows and outflows and their
empirical counterparts. As we highlighted in Section 5, the fit of the model is not perfect with
respect to the levels of these transition probabilities (which are not targeted by the calibration).
Nevertheless, the model is able to capture certain dynamic aspects of the decline of multiple
jobholding, namely that (i) it is driven mostly by lower worker inflows while (ii) the outflows
remain approximately constant over time (see Fact 10 in Section 2).
22Thus, in most instances, the secondary employer would be willing to pay a fee to the worker to induce her
to quit her primary job, but our assumptions effectively rule out these types of arrangements.
23The purpose of Figure 2 is to demonstrate the model’s ability to account for the outcomes that interest
us in this section. In the numerical experiments, we focus on comparing the years 1995 and 2015. The period
from the mid-2010s until today is characterized by stable behavior of the time series. Thus, assuming that the
economy is at a steady state at the end of the sample period is perhaps not unreasonable. The assumption is
more debatable for the initial subperiod, although multiple jobholding seems to be roughly constant over the
years 1994 through 1996.
24As in Figure 1, to preserve legibility, we report the outcomes of only one model for each gender group; we
use models with an intermediate value of 0.45 for the Frisch elasticity. The plots in Figures 2 and 3 are very
similar for the economies calibrated with low and high values of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
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[Figure 2 about here.]
[Figure 3 about here.]
6.1 Sources of changes in multiple jobholding
The top panel of Table 4 complements Figure 2 in two ways. First, it provides figures quantifying
the joint decline of job-to-job transitions and multiple jobholding. Between 1995 and 2015, the
job-to-job transition probability fell by 35.3 percent among men and by 28.5 percent among
women, and the corresponding numbers for the multiple jobholding share are respectively 32.6
percent and 19.6 percent. To explain these changes, the model requires substantial changes in
the search effort of employed workers, se. It predicts a decrease by 47 percent for men and by
37–39 percent for women. At the same time, according to the model, the flow cost of working
a second job, ω2, increased by 11–13 percent for men and by 5–6 percent for women (half the
increase of the parameter for men).
[Table 4 about here.]
In the middle panel of Table 4, we run the following experiment: We hold ω2 constant to
its 1995 level and calculate counterfactual changes in the job-to-job transition probability and
multiple jobholding share implied solely by the dynamics of se. Perhaps surprisingly, we find
that the large decrease in se contributed to raising the multiple jobholding share. On the one
hand, a lower se implies lower inflows into multiple jobholding as single jobholders become less
likely to meet an outside employer. On the other hand, conditional on holding a second job,
multiple jobholders become reluctant to give it up as they anticipate that holding a second
job in the future is unlikely. From 1995 to 2015, the decrease of se is so large that the longer
duration of spells of multiple jobholding offsets the negative effect of lower worker inflows.
These mechanisms are important to draw an inference about changes in the cost of working
a second job. That is, ignoring the change in se revealed by the dynamics of the job-to-job
transition probability would lead to an underestimation of the increase in ω2.
The lower panel of Table 4 reports results from another experiment, in which se is held
constant to its 1995 level while only ω2 changes over time. First, conditional on holding two
job opportunities, a higher ω2 induces workers to switch employers instead of choosing multiple
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jobholding. This is because a higher ω2 moves the thresholds y˜d (y1, z) upward in Figure 1,
thus leaving more mass in values of y1 where a job-to-job transition is likely to occur in the
near future. As a result, the increase in ω2 contributed to dampening the decrease of job-to-job
transitions. We find that this effect is quantitatively limited: the counterfactual increases of
the job-to-job transition probability are never higher than 2.5 percent. Second, if se remains
unchanged from its 1995 value, then the change in ω2 overpredicts the decline of the multiple
jobholding share. This is in line with our previous discussion of the role of changes in se. The
effect is especially large among male workers. Indeed, we find that the predicted change exceeds
the change driven by the joint dynamics of se and ω2 by more than 20 percent (the predicted
decrease for male workers is between −39 and −41 percent vs. −33 percent for the decrease
resulting from the joint behavior of se and ω2).
We reach two main conclusions through this set of experiments. First, multiple jobholding
is very elastic to the flow cost incurred by working a second job. Therefore, the dynamics of
the parameter ω2 are of first-order importance to understanding the dynamics of the multiple
jobholding share. Second, while the role of the search effort se is secondary, it cannot be
ignored in understanding the decision to give up the second job. By extension, search frictions,
as measured by se, matter for quantifying the role and change over time of ω2. In the last
paragraphs of this section, we provide several observations to help interpret the dynamics of se
and ω2 as revealed by the experiments.
6.2 Implications for search frictions
Next, we evaluate the contribution of multiple jobholding to search frictions. The questions we
ask are as follows: Moving on from 1995 to 2015, what is the effect of the increase in ω2 on
job creation efforts? Does it improve incentives for firms to create more vacancies, or instead
deter vacancy postings? What are the channels through which ω2 affects the vacancy-posting
decisions of firms? How important are these channels?
To answer these questions, we examine the job creation condition through the lens of a simple
decomposition. Let us define Ω = {p (y1, z) , d (y1, y2, z) , ` (y1, y2, z) , ϕ0 (z) , ϕ1 (y1, z)} and
S = {S (y1, z) , S (y1, y2, z)}. We use these notations to define the expected surplus conditional
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on meeting, E (S|Ω), given by
E (S|Ω) =
ˆ ˆ
p (y′1, z
′)S (y′1, z
′) dF0 (y′1) dG (z
′|z) ϕ0 (z)
ϕ¯0 + seϕ¯1
dz
+
ˆ ˆ ˆ
(` (y′1, y
′
2, z
′) p (y′2, z
′)S (y′2, z
′) + (1− ` (y′1, y′2, z′)) p (y′1, z′)
×d (y′1, y′2, z′)S (y′1, y′2, z′)) dF0 (y′2) dF (y′1|y1) dG (z′|z)
seϕ1 (y1, z)
ϕ¯0 + seϕ¯1
dy1dz. (33)
Next, we let v denote vacancies, and we denote variables from the final steady-state equilibrium,
viz. the equilibrium in 2015, with an upper tilde ( .˜ ). We can decompose the change in vacancies
from initial to final steady states using the following relation:
v˜ − v = (( ˜¯ϕ0 + se ˜¯ϕ1)− (ϕ¯0 + seϕ¯1)) θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
meeting probability
(extensive search margin)
+
(χ
κ
β (1− φ)
) 1
α
(
E
(
S|Ω˜
) 1
α − E (S|Ω) 1α
)
( ˜¯ϕ0 + se ˜¯ϕ1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
matching | meeting
(intensive search margin)
+
(χ
κ
β (1− φ)
) 1
α
(
E
(
S˜|Ω˜
) 1
α − E
(
S|Ω˜
) 1
α
)
( ˜¯ϕ0 + se ˜¯ϕ1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
surplus | matching
(changing job stability)
. (34)
The first term is the effect of ω2 on the extensive margin of search. As ω2 increases and deters
workers from taking on second jobs, the number of single jobholders, and therefore the number
of job seekers, increases. Through the matching function, this generates a positive externality
on the decision of firms to open more vacancies (as the probability of meeting a job seeker
increases). The second term measures the effect of the intensive margin of search. Conditional
on meeting a worker, there is a higher probability that this worker will give up her current job
and accept the outside job offer if ω2 is higher. Again, this margin is expected to contribute
positively to vacancy creation. Third, the surplus of employment is lower when ω2 increases.
This is because any increase in a cost of employment relative to nonemployment lowers the
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match surplus. It is also straightforward to interpret this effect from the perspective of a firm
that has been able to fill its vacant position. A higher ω2 increases the probability that the
worker accepts the outside job offers she will receive in the future, meaning that the duration
of the filled position is shortened. We call this a reduction in job stability.
In Table 5, we quantify the impact of the rising costs of holding a second job on job creation.
We evaluate the effects of increasing ω2 both in 1995, when se was higher, and in 2015, when se
had suffered a large decline. The last row in each panel of Table 5 reports the percent change
in vacancies between the initial and final steady state. The other rows report the relative
contribution of each of the three channels identified by Equation (34) to changes in vacancies.25
[Table 5 about here.]
Three results stand out. First, the decline of multiple jobholding contributed to improving
job creation efforts: the number of posted vacancies increases in all instances. The largest
effect concerns male workers in the experiment based on the 2015 value of se, in which the
number of vacancies increases by more than 6 percent in response to the change in the flow
cost of working a second job. Second, the effect is positive because the extensive and intensive
margins of search contribute positively and, combined, their impact is larger than the negative
effect of reduced job stability. Third, a robust finding is that the intensive margin of search is
the most important contributor to changes in job creation efforts. In fact, when we evaluate
the role of increasing ω2 at the 2015 value of se, the effects of the extensive search margin and
reduced job stability cancel each other out, so that the improvement in vacancies is entirely
driven by the intensive margin of search frictions. At any rate, the experiments indicate that
the increase in ω2, driving the decline of multiple jobholding, contributed to reducing search
frictions for workers.
6.3 Robustness and discussion
The results of this section are very robust to calibration choices. In calculations not reported
here, we recalibrate all parameter values to match data moments in 1995, rerun the experiments,
and obtain results that are similar quantitatively to those presented in Tables 4 and 5. The
25In principle, the magnitude of the effects is not independent of the order in which the adjustments moving
the economy from initial to final steady states are implemented. Meanwhile, in practice we find that the results
are quantitatively similar when we change the order of the adjustments.
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same conclusion holds when data moments in 2015 are used to inform the calibration. More
importantly, in our view, we find quantitatively similar results if we target a richer dynamics
than that depicted in Figure 2. In Appendix C, we run the experiments of changing se and ω2,
as well as the technology parameter ψ, to match the joint changes of the job-to-job transition
probability, the multiple jobholding share, and the share of workers who report working 40
hours. That share has increased substantially over time—by more than 25 percent for both
gender groups. According to our model, this implies a major shift in technology, as ψ must
be increased by at least 70 percent in order to explain this evolution. Meanwhile, the orders
of magnitude of changes in se and ω2 remain in the same ballpark relative to Table 4. The
implications of changes in ω2 for search frictions remain positive, too. Vacancies increase by 6
to 8 percent among men and by 2 to 4 percent among women.
Dispersion over time vs. across space. In the experiments, we focus on the time variation
of the multiple jobholding share. Section 2 points out two other sources of dispersion in multiple
jobholding. One, multiple jobholding varies significantly by education and primary occupation
of employment (Fact 6). Two, multiple jobholding decreases markedly with market size (Fact
7): the multiple jobholding share is typically higher by 1.5 percentage points in nonmetropolitan
areas compared to metropolitan areas. We used our model to understand these differences. We
recalibrated its parameters by targeting data moments separately by area type. The model
consistently attributes the bulk of the dispersion in multiple jobholding to the flow cost of
working a second job ω2. That is, a 12 percent higher ω2 in metropolitan areas explains why
these areas’ multiple jobholding shares are lower than in nonmetropolitan areas. This lines
up well with the results of Hirsch et al. [2017], who focused specifically on understanding the
dispersion of multiple jobholding shares across cities. They write, "Differences in industry
and occupation structure, commute times, job churn rates, and ancestry patterns explain a
significant share of the MJH variation acros MSAs’" [Hirsch et al., 2017, p.27].
Interpreting changes in se and ω2. To summarize, we uncover an internally coherent
picture of changes of certain aggregate variables. Over the past two decades, the propensity of
single jobholders to gain additional work opportunities has decreased, and the cost of working
a second job has increased. The change in search effort is substantial: se dropped by almost
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one-half among men and by more than one-third among women. It seems more difficult to
determine whether the change in the cost parameter ω2 is large or not. In the next paragraphs,
we draw on external information to provide observations that substantiate these findings.
There is a voluminous literature devoted to the decline in U.S. labor market dynamism. The
Brookings paper by Molloy et al. [2016] provides a useful entry into that literature.26 On the
explanation side, the authors attribute much of the decline (measured by lower worker mobility)
to a worsening of the distribution of outside job offers.27 Our model agrees with this explanation.
That is, se is exogenous in the model, but it is likely that with endogenous on-the-job search
efforts, the increase in ω2 over time would contribute to reducing se. Regarding the implications,
Molloy et al. [2016] point out that the decline in U.S. labor market dynamism may have negative
consequences, such as a less efficient allocation of resources, but also positive effects coming from
reduced uncertainty over one’s labor market trajectory. Against this backdrop, our analysis
makes a point that has so far been overlooked: conditional on meeting an employed worker,
there is a nonnegligible probability that this worker will opt for the multiple jobholding option.
This has a negative impact on vacancy posting, as the worker manages to extract a higher wage
from the outside employer. Thus, seen from this perspective, the reduction in se and increase
in ω2 may actually portend good news for labor market dynamism.
The finding that ω2 has increased over time is challenging to interpret and explain, but it
seems to dovetail with several empirical observations. A plausible interpretation is that this
reflects a shift in the structure of employment (e.g., occupations or industries) toward primary
jobs that provide less flexibility to workers. This observation is consistent with the increase
in the share of workers at 40 hours that we described in the previous paragraphs; see Figure
4 in the appendix. This lower flexibility could be due to the increasing bargaining power of
employers, to changes in the organization of the work schedules within firms, or to a distribution
of jobs across firms that increase costs to travel from one job to the other. We note, however,
that this interpretation is not easy to reconcile with a major trend in the structure of U.S.
employment—namely, the decline of the manufacturing sector. Jobs in this sector provide
26Relevant references that focus on the dynamics of job-to-job transitions in the U.S. labor market include
Bjelland et al. [2011], Hyatt and McEntarfer [2012] and Hyatt and Spletzer [2013]. Decker et al. [2016] provide
a useful overview that is indicative of several potential explanations.
27Davis and Haltiwanger [2014] indicate that an increasing share of employment is concentrated in occu-
pations that require licensing, and that this could contribute to increasing the cost of occupational mobility.
Molloy et al. [2016] find little support for this explanation.
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little flexibility in terms of hours, so the falling share of manufacturing employment implies
that the average job in the final steady state must be associated with a lower ω2.28 Another
interpretation of the increase in ω2 is that it captures changes in preferences over leisure, changes
in leisure goods, or changes in the technology used to transform nonmarket time into goods
(see Greenwood and Vandenbroucke [2008]). Aguiar and Hurst [2007] and Ramey and Francis
[2009] have documented that time spent on market work has fallen secularly and that leisure
time has increased over time.29 The decrease in hours of market work is concentrated on men,
but the increase in leisure time concerns both men and women. The numerical experiments
seem to be consistent with this gender difference in that the increase in ω2 is higher for male
than for female workers. All in all, we think interpretations based on the changing structure
of employment and changes in leisure-work preferences are likely to complement each other.
For instance, some occupations are more stressful than others, some occupations are associated
with positive nonpecuniary benefits, and so on. Fitting the model to match disaggregated data
could provide additional insights into the interpretation of the cost parameter ω2 and the source
of its changes over time.
7 Conclusion and Future Work
We developed a general equilibrium theory of multiple jobholding. This theory is quantitative,
and so we used it to draw inferences about a number of key aggregate variables. We reached
the following conclusions. First, in addition to the hours schedule of individuals (notably
the distinction between full-time and part-time employment), accounting for the flow cost of
working a second job is key to properly understand multiple jobholding. This cost is sizable by
several metrics, and in all likelihood nonmonetary factors (e.g., disutility from work, preferences
over amenities, etc.) are among the important underlying contributors. Second, search frictions
explain little of the differences in multiple jobholding over time and across space. Search
frictions are nevertheless important to draw inferences about the levels and changes in the
28Lalé [2015] documents that workers whose primary industry of employment is in mining, construction,
manufacturing, or transportation, are significantly less likely to hold a second job. However, the decline in
multiple jobholding occurs within industries, so that composition effects coming from the changing structure of
employment cannot explain the trend in aggregate data.
29The trends in leisure time in Aguiar and Hurst [2007] are different from those in Ramey and Francis [2009].
It seems that this difference is mostly driven by the categorization of certain activities (for example: eating
while in the workplace) into "market" versus "nonmarket" time.
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costs of working a second job. Viewed through the lens of the model, the past two decades have
witnessed a massive decline in on-the-job search effort and a significant increase in the costs of
working a second job. Third, while some worry that these dynamics herald a less-flexible labor
market, our model indicates that the increase in the costs of working a second job contributed
to reducing search frictions. The improvements in job creation incentives are brought about by
a positive impact on the aggregate meeting probability (due to a larger pool of job seekers) as
well as the probability of job acceptance conditional on meeting.
The proposed theory opens up new opportunities for research. First, hours constraints
are often identified by comparing the outcomes of specific regressions of total hours worked
on wages among single versus multiple jobholders. This reduced-form approach is valid only
under certain assumptions on both workers’ preferences and the wage-hour-setting protocol.
It would be useful to revisit this approach through the lens of our structural model. Second,
empirical research that looks at the effects of income taxation on hours worked finds very large
differences in labor supply elasticities when measured using the primary or secondary job. The
underlying reasons, which often remain unclear, hold different implications for tax policies, and
in particular for whether secondary jobs should be tax exempt. The framework proposed here
is suitable for investigating these effects in detail and deriving policy implications. We leave
these and other applications for future research.
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Appendices
A Model appendix
Appendix A.1 contains the proof of Proposition 1. Appendix A.2 presents the Bellman equa-
tions associated to N (z), E (y1, z), E (y1, y2, z), J (y1, z), J1 (y1, y2, z), J2 (y1, y2, z). It shows
how to combine them with the policy functions from Proposition 1 and the surplus-sharing
Equations (8) and (9) in order to arrive at Equations (20), (23) and (25). Appendix A.3 dis-
cusses a simple modification of the model that introduces a lower mass point in the distribution
of hours worked.
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
The first two policy functions, p (y1, z) and d (y1, y2, z), are trivially related to joint match
surpluses. We have
p (y1, z) = 1 {J (y1, z) ≥ 0} = 1 {(1− φ)S (y1, z) ≥ 0} = 1 {S (y1, z) ≥ 0}
and
d (y1, y2, z) = 1 {E (y1, y2, z) ≥ E (y1, z)} = 1 {φS (y1, y2, z) ≥ 0} = 1 {S (y1, y2, z) ≥ 0} .
Next, we look at
` (y1, y2, z) = 1 {max {E (y2, z) , N (z)} ≥ max {E (y1, z) , E (y1, z)
+p (y1, z) (E (y1, y2, z)− E (y1, z)) , N (z)}} .
Subtracting N (z) on both side of the inequality yields
` (y1, y2, z) = 1 {max {E (y2, z)−N (z) , 0} ≥ max {E (y1, z)−N (z) , E (y1, z)
+p (y1, z) (E (y1, y2, z)− E (y1, z))−N (z) , 0}} .
On the one hand, we have
max {E (y2, z)−N (z) , 0} = max {φS (y2, z) , 0} = p (y2, z)φS (y2, z) .
On the other, E (y1, z) − N (z) = φS (y1, z) and E (y1, y2, z) − E (y1, z) = φS (y1, y2, z), and
thus we have
max {E (y1, z)−N (z) , E (y1, z) + p (y1, z) (E (y1, y2, z)− E (y1, z))−N (z) , 0}
= max {φS (y1, z) , φ (S (y1, z) + p (y1, z)S (y1, y2, z)) , 0}
= max {max {φS (y1, z) , φ (S (y1, z) + p (y1, z)S (y1, y2, z))} , 0}
= max {φS (y1, z) + max {0, p (y1, z)φS (y1, y2, z)} , 0}
= max {φS (y1, z) + p (y1, z) d (y1, y2, z)φS (y1, y2, z) , 0} .
If S (y1, z) ≥ 0 then S (y1, z) + p (y1, z) d (y1, y2, z)S (y1, y2, z) ≥ 0, so that we also have
max {φS (y1, z) + p (y1, z) d (y1, y2, z)φS (y1, y2, z) , 0} = p (y1, z)φ (S (y1, z)
+ d (y1, y2, z)S (y1, y2, z)) ,
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we arrive at
` (y1, y2, z) = 1 {p (y2, z)S (y2, z) ≥ p (y1, z) (S (y1, z) + d (y1, y2, z)S (y1, y2, z))} .
A.2 Bellman equations
The asset value of a non-employed worker is
N (z) = β
ˆ (
(1− λ0)N (z′) + λ0
ˆ
max {E (y′1, z′) , N (z′)} dF0 (y′1)
)
dG (z′|z)
= β
ˆ (
N (z′) + λ0
ˆ
max {E (y′1, z′)−N (z′) , 0} dF0 (y′1)
)
dG (z′|z) ,
and since E (y1, z)−N (z) = φS (y1, z) , we have
N (z) = β
ˆ (
N (z′) + λ0
ˆ
max {φS (y′1, z′) , 0} dF0 (y′1)
)
dG (z′|z)
= β
ˆ (
N (z′) + λ0φ
ˆ
p (y′1, z
′)S (y′1, z
′) dF0 (y′1)
)
dG (z′|z)
using the policy function p (y1, z) = 1 {S (y1, z) ≥ 0}.
The asset value of a single jobholder is
E (y1, z) = w (y1, z)− ω1 + zg (1− h (y1, z)) + β
ˆ (
(1− λ1)
ˆ
max {E (y′1, z′) ,
N (z′)} dF (y′1|y1) + λ1
ˆ ˆ
max {E (y′1, z′) + p (y′1, z′) (E (y′1, y′2, z′)− E (y′1, z′)) ,
E (y′1, z
′) , E (y′2, z
′) , N (z′)} dF0 (y′2) dF (y′1|y1)
)
dG (z′|z)
= w (y1, z)− ω1 + zg (1− h (y1, z)) + β
ˆ (
N (z′) + (1− λ1)
ˆ
max {E (y′1, z′)
−N (z′) , 0} dF (y′1|y1) + λ1
ˆ ˆ
max {E (y′1, z′) + p (y′1, z′) (E (y′1, y′2, z′)− E (y′1, z′))
−N (z′) , E (y′1, z′)−N (z′) , E (y′2, z′)−N (z′) , 0} dF0 (y′2) dF (y′1|y1)
)
dG (z′|z) .
Since E (y1, z)−N (z) = φS (y1, z) and E (y1, y2, z)− E (y1, z) = φS (y1, y2, z) via the surplus-
sharing equations (8) and (9), it follows that
E (y1, z) = w (y1, z)− ω1 + zg (1− h (y1, z)) + β
ˆ (
N (z′) + (1− λ1)
×
ˆ
max {φS (y′1, z′) , 0} dF (y′1|y1) + λ1
ˆ ˆ
max {φ (S (y1, z) + p (y1, z)S (y1, y2, z)) ,
φS (y′1, z
′) , φS (y′2, z
′) , 0} dF0 (y′2) dF (y′1|y1)
)
dG (z′|z) .
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Last, using the policy functions and results from Appendix A.1 we obtain
E (y1, z) = w (y1, z)− ω1 + zg (1− h (y1, z)) + β
ˆ (
N (z′) + (1− λ1)
ˆ
φp (y′1, z
′)
× S (y′1, z′) dF (y′1|y1) + λ1
ˆ ˆ
φ (` (y′1, y
′
2, z
′) p (y′2, z
′)S (y′2, z
′) + (1− ` (y′1, y′2, z′))
×p (y′1, z′) (S (y′1, z′) + d (y′1, y′2, z′)S (y′1, y′2, z′))) dF0 (y′2) dF (y′1|y1)
)
dG (z′|z)
given that: if ` (y1, y2, z) = 1, then the worker receives φS (y2, z) if p (y2, z) = 1; and if
` (y1, y2, z) = 0 and p (y1, z) = 1, the worker receives φS (y1, z) and in addition she receives
φS (y1, y2, z) if d (y1, y2, z) = 1.
The asset value of a multiple jobholder is
E (y1, y2, z) = w (y1, z)− ω1 + w (y1, y2, z)− ω2 + zg (1− h (y1, z)− h (y1, y2, z))
+ β
ˆ ((ˆ
(1− p (y′1, z′)) dF (y′1|y1)
) ˆ
max {E (y′2, z′) , N (z′)} dF (y′2|y2)
+
ˆ ˆ
(p (y′1, z
′) (E (y′1, z
′) + d (y′1, y
′
2, z
′) (E (y′1, y
′
2, z
′)
−E (y′1, z′)))) dF (y′2|y2) dF (y′1|y1)
)
dG (z′|z)
= w (y1, z)− ω1 + w (y1, y2, z)− ω2 + zg (1− h (y1, z)− h (y1, y2, z))
+ β
ˆ (
N (z′) +
(ˆ
(1− p (y′1, z′)) dF (y′1|y1)
) ˆ
max {E (y′2, z′)−N (z′)
, 0} dF (y′2|y2) +
ˆ ˆ
(p (y′1, z
′) (E (y′1, z
′)−N (z′) + d (y′1, y′2, z′) (E (y′1, y′2, z′)
−E (y′1, z′)))) dF (y′2|y2) dF (y′1|y1)
)
dG (z′|z)
where we have made use directly of the policy functions p (y1, z) and d (y1, y2, z). Surplus
sharing and making use of p (y2, z) for the second job yields
E (y1, y2, z) = w (y1, z)− ω1 + w (y1, y2, z)− ω2 + zg (1− h (y1, z)− h (y1, y2, z))
+ β
ˆ (
N (z′) +
(ˆ
(1− p (y′1, z′)) dF (y′1|y1)
)ˆ
max {φS (y′2, z′) , 0} dF (y′2|y2)
+
ˆ ˆ
(p (y′1, z
′) (φS (y′1, z
′) + d (y′1, y
′
2, z
′)
×φS (y′1, y′2, z′))) dF (y′2|y2) dF (y′1|y1)
)
dG (z′|z)
= w (y1, z)− ω1 + w (y1, y2, z)− ω2 + zg (1− h (y1, z)− h (y1, y2, z))
+ β
ˆ (
N (z′) +
(ˆ
(1− p (y′1, z′)) dF (y′1|y1)
)ˆ
φp (y′2, z
′)S (y′2, z
′) dF (y′2|y2)
+
ˆ ˆ
(φp (y′1, z
′) (S (y′1, z
′) + d (y′1, y
′
2, z
′)S (y′1, y
′
2, z
′))) dF (y′2|y2) dF (y′1|y1)
)
dG (z′|z) .
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Next, the asset value of employing a single jobholder is
J (y1, z) = y1f (h (y1, z))− w (y1, z) + β
ˆ (
λ1
ˆ ˆ
((1− ` (y′1, y′2, z′)) p (y′1, z′)
× ((1− d (y′1, y′2, z′)) J (y′1, z′) + d (y′1, y′2, z′) J1 (y′1, y′2, z′))) dF0 (y′2) dF (y′1|y1)
+ (1− λ1)
ˆ
max {J (y′1, z′) , 0} dF (y′1|y1)
)
dG (z′|z)
= y1f (h (y1, z))− w (y1, z) + β
ˆ (
λ1
ˆ ˆ
((1− ` (y′1, y′2, z′)) p (y′1, z′)
× (J (y′1, z′) + d (y′1, y′2, z′) (J1 (y′1, y′2, z′)− J (y′1, z′)))) dF0 (y′2) dF (y′1|y1)
+ (1− λ1)
ˆ
max {J (y′1, z′) , 0} dF (y′1|y1)
)
dG (z′|z)
where, again, we have made direct use of the policy functions p (y1, z) and d (y1, y2, z) to simplify
notations. Notice that p (y1, z) multiplies J1 (y1, y2, z) in the above equation, as the participation
of the primary employer must be ensured. With the surplus sharing rule, we arrive at
J (y1, z) = y1f (h (y1, z))− w (y1, z) + β
ˆ (
λ1
ˆ ˆ
((1− ` (y′1, y′2, z′)) p (y′1, z′)
× ((1− φ)S (y′1, z′) + d (y′1, y′2, z′) (J1 (y′1, y′2, z′)− (1− φ)S (y′1, z′)))) dF0 (y′2) dF (y′1|y1)
+ (1− λ1)
ˆ
(1− φ) p (y′1, z′)S (y′1, z′) dF (y′1|y1)
)
dG (z′|z) .
In order to write the asset value of the primary employer, recall that the value in the
continuation period depends on d (y1, y2, z), the worker’s decision to keep the second job, and
on the constraint that the job remains viable captured by p (y1, z). Thus, the asset value of the
primary employer is
J1 (y1, y2, z) = y1f (h (y1, z))− w (y1, z) + β
ˆ ˆ ˆ
(d (y′1, y
′
2, z
′) p (y′1, z
′) J1 (y1, y2, z)
+ (1− d (y′1, y′2, z′)) max {J (y′1, z′) , 0}) dF (y′2|y2) dF (y′1|y1) dG (z′|z)
= y1f (h (y1, z))− w (y1, z) + β
ˆ ˆ
p (y′1, z
′)
(
(1− φ)S (y′1, z′) +
ˆ
(d (y′1, y
′
2, z
′)
× (J1 (y′1, y′2, z′)− (1− φ)S (y′1, z′)) dF (y′2|y2)
)
dF (y′1|y1) dG (z′|z) .
The last equation uses the surplus sharing rule, and so we arrive at equation (25).
Last, the asset value of being the secondary employer of a multiple jobholder is
J2 (y1, y2, z) = y2f (h (y1, y2, z))− w (y1, y2, z) + β
ˆ (ˆ ˆ
(d (y′1, y
′
2, z
′) p (y′1, z
′)
×max {J2 (y′1, y′2, z′) , 0}) dF (y′2|y2) dF (y′1|y1) +
(ˆ
(1− p (y′1, z′)) dF (y′1|y1)
)
×
(ˆ
max {J (y′2, z′) , 0} dF (y′2|y2)
))
dG (z′|z) ,
taking account of the workers’ commitment p (y1, z) = 1 {J (y′1, z′) ≥ 0} towards her primary
employer. Therefore we have
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J2 (y1, y2, z) = y2f (h (y1, y2, z))− w (y1, y2, z) + β
ˆ (ˆ ˆ
(d (y′1, y
′
2, z
′) p (y′1, z
′)
×max {(1− φ)S (y′1, y′2, z′) , 0}) dF (y′2|y2) dF (y′1|y1) +
(ˆ
(1− p (y′1, z′)) dF (y′1|y1)
)
×
(ˆ
max {(1− φ)S (y′2, z′) , 0} dF (y′2|y2)
))
dG (z′|z)
= y2f (h (y1, y2, z))− w (y1, y2, z) + β
ˆ (ˆ ˆ
(d (y′1, y
′
2, z
′) p (y′1, z
′)
× (1− φ)S (y′1, y′2, z′) dF (y′2|y2) dF (y′1|y1) +
(ˆ
(1− p (y′1, z′)) dF (y′1|y1)
)
×
(ˆ
p (y′1, z
′) (1− φ)S (y′2, z′) dF (y′2|y2)
))
dG (z′|z) .
Here, we have used the policy functions from Proposition 1 and the surplus sharing equations.
In particular, observe that d (y′1, y′2, z′) max {J2 (y′1, y′2, z′) , 0} = d (y′1, y′2, z′) J2 (y′1, y′2, z′) since
d (y′1, y
′
2, z
′) = 1 {S (y′1, y′2, z′) ≥ 0} = 1 {J2 (y′1, y′2, z′) ≥ 0}.
To complete the derivation, add up the last equations we have obtained for E (y1, z) and
J (y1, z) and subtract N (z) in order to arrive at Equation (20) (S (y1, z)). Similarly, add up
the last equations we have obtained for E (y1, y2, z) and J2 (y1, y2, z) and subtract E (y1, z) =
φS (y1, z)+N (z) to arrive at equation (23) (S (y1, y2, z)). Finally, to recover the wage functions,
rearrange the last equation we have obtained for J (y1, z) and J2 (y1, y2, z) to compute w (y1, z)
and w (y1, y2, z). In these calculations, use J (y1, z) = (1− φ)S (y1, z) and J2 (y1, y2, z) =
(1− φ)S (y1, y2, z) on the left-hand side of each equation.
A.3 Lower hours threshold
In the model, the discontinuous mapping from hours worked onto labor services is motivated
by the empirical observation that a very large share of individuals report working exactly 40
hours per week. A closer look at the data reveals that there are also some significant mass
points at lower hours, such as 10 or 15 weekly hours (see, for instance, the online appendix of
Borowczyk-Martins and Lalé [2019]). It is straightforward to amend the model to explain this
additional feature of the distribution of hours worked, by introducing a lower (or minimum)
hours requirement in the labor service function. Instead of functional form (4), we postulate
the following piecewise linear function with three bends:
f (ht) =

0 if ht < h
(1− ψ)ht if h ≤ ht < h¯
(1− ψ)ht + ψ if ht ≥ h¯
.
h denotes the exogenous lower amount of hours required to obtain positive labor services.
Under this specification, we obtain two thresholds on match productivity conditional on z.
The first threshold, which is trivial to work out, is the level of match productivity yh (z) such
that yh (z) f (h) + zg (1− h) = yh (z) f (0) + zg (1) = 0. Solving this equation, we obtain
yh (z) =
1
(1− ψ)h
(1− h)1− 1γ − 1
1
γ
− 1 z.
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The other threshold, yh¯ (z), is equal to the threshold yh¯ (z) defined by Equation (10). The
hours schedule we obtain is
h (y1, z) =

0 if y < yh (z)
h if yh (z) ≤ y < yh¯ (z)
1−
(
z
(1−ψ)y1
)γ
if yh (z) ≤ y < yh (z) or y ≥ yh¯ (z)
.
A threshold yh (y1, z) can be calculated in a similar fashion to amend the hours schedule of
multiple jobholders, h (y1, y2, z).
B Data appendix
Data. The data used to inform the calibration and experiments come from the monthly files
of the Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS is a survey of households administered by the
U.S. Census Bureau under the auspices of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Since January
1994, the CPS has been collecting information which allow to identify multiple jobholders. The
survey asks respondents about the number of jobs held during the reference week, whether they
usually receive a wage or salary from the primary job, and collects information on hours worked
for up to two jobs. Starting in January 1994, the CPS also measures whether individuals change
employers from one month to the next.
CPS respondents are interviewed for four consecutive months, are rotated out of the survey
for eight months, and are included in the survey again for four consecutive months. As a result,
in each monthly file of the CPS, about three-quarters of respondents were already in the sample
in the previous month. We use this feature to match individuals from the non-outgoing groups
so as to measure gross labor market flows and construct transition probabilities. Throughout
the analysis, we focus on workers aged 25 to 54 years old.
Framework. We use a stock-flow framework to compute transitions in and out of multiple
jobholding. In each period t, individuals are classified into one of the following states: multiple
jobholding with a full-time primary job (FM), multiple jobholding with a part-time primary
job (PM), single jobholding with a full-time job (FS), single jobholding with a part-time job
(PS), and nonemployment (N). We let the vector st contain the number of individuals (stocks)
in each of these states:
st = [ FM PM︸ ︷︷ ︸
M
FS PS︸ ︷︷ ︸
S
N ]
′
t,
where M = FM + PM (resp. S = FS + PS) is the number of multiple jobholders (resp. single
jobholders) in period t. As is standard, the evolution of st is described by means of a discrete-
time, first-order Markov chain:
st = Πtst−1.
In this equation, Πt is the stochastic matrix of transition probabilities across labor market
states i and j. Each of these transition probabilities is measured by the gross flow of workers
from state i to state j at time t divided by the stock of workers in state i at time t − 1. We
clear transition probabilities from several measurement issues: we adjust them to control for
systematic seasonal variations, margin error discrepancies and time-aggregation bias (see Lalé
[2016] for details about these adjustments).
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C Additional results
In this appendix, we provide additional results summarized in Subsection 6.3 of the text. We
inform the model using a richer dynamic, namely we calibrate se, ψ and ω2 by targeting the
joint behavior of the following time series: the job-to-job transition probability, the share of
workers reporting exactly 40 hours of weekly work, and the multiple jobholding share. The
solid lines in Figure 4 present the dynamics of these time series, and the dotted lines show
their model counterparts. Table 6 is the analogue of Table 4 of the main text. The table
reports the joint changes in se, ψ, ω2 implied by Figure 4. It also reports results from three
counterfactual calculations illustrating the role of each parameter. In Table 7, we rerun the
experiments measuring the implications of the increase of ω2 for vacancy posting. For simplicity,
we evaluate the effects at the 1995 value of the bundle (se, ψ) and at the 2015 value of (se, ψ).
The results presented in Tables 6 and 7 are much in line with the baseline results.
[Table 6 about here.]
[Figure 4 about here.]
[Table 7 about here.]
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Table 1: Parameter values
Parameters set externally
1 discount factor β 0.9951
2 threshold for full-time work h¯ 0.4
3 match prod., persistence ρy 0.975
4 match prod., unconditional mean µy 1.0
5 tightness elasticity of job filling α 0.5
6 bargaining power of workers φ 0.5
7 matching efficiency χ 0.50
Men Women
Parameters set internally L H L H
1 home prod., persistence ρz 0.797 0.848 0.995 0.995
2 home prod., unconditional mean µz 0.152 0.464 0.097 0.418
3 home prod., standard dev. σz 0.078 0.168 0.009 0.042
4 prod. gap at h¯ hours ψ 0.046 0.072 0.010 0.024
5 vacancy posting cost κ 0.093 0.101 0.087 0.092
6 match prod. shock, standard dev. σε 0.145 0.166 0.161 0.189
7 on-the-job search efficiency se 0.392 0.399 0.391 0.395
8 cost of working job 1 ω1 0.244 0.151 0.243 0.129
9 cost of working job 2 ω2 0.099 0.119 0.098 0.116
Notes: The model period is set to be one month. L and H indicate that the curvature parameter γ is set
to match respectively low (0.30) and high (0.60) values of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
48
Table 2: Targeted and untargeted moments
Men Women
Targeted moments Data L H Data L H
1 FS to PS trans. prob. 2.14 2.09 2.28 4.50 6.44 6.58
2 share under 40 hours 5.94 5.91 5.94 20.7 20.8 21.1
3 average hours per worker 43.3 43.3 43.1 37.6 39.5 38.5
4 share at 40 hours 45.4 45.4 45.3 44.5 45.5 44.5
5 job creation cost 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.0 14.0 13.9
6 E to N trans. prob. 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.49 2.48
7 E to E trans. prob. 2.00 1.99 2.00 1.93 1.92 1.92
8 N to E trans. prob. 31.3 31.3 31.4 31.3 31.3 31.3
9 MJH share 5.59 5.61 5.59 5.92 5.99 6.05
Untargeted moments Data L H Data L H
1 FS to M trans. prob. 1.89 1.52 1.56 1.78 1.37 1.35
2 PS to M trans. prob. 4.58 3.22 3.26 3.45 3.10 3.04
3 N to M trans. prob. 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00
4 FM to S trans. prob. 29.3 25.9 25.0 28.9 23.1 22.2
5 FM to N trans. prob. 0.57 0.41 0.31 0.56 0.05 0.02
6 PM to S trans. prob. 31.6 31.9 33.2 30.6 30.5 30.2
7 PM to N trans. prob. 2.42 1.71 1.69 1.29 1.13 0.97
Notes: Data moments are computed from the monthly files of the Current Population Survey over the
years 1994 to 2018; see Appendix B for details. E: employment; N : nonemployment; FS : single job-
holding with a full-time primary job; PS : single jobholding with a part-time primary job; S = FS + PS :
single jobholding; FM : multiple jobholding working full-time on the primary job; PM : multiple jobhold-
ing working part-time on the primary job; M = FM + PM : multiple jobholding. The job creation cost
is the ratio between the vacancy posting cost and average quarterly earnings. L and H indicate that
the curvature parameter γ is set to match respectively low (0.30) and high (0.60) values of the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply. All table entries are expressed in percent.
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Table 3: Additional model outcomes
Men Women
Costs of working L H L H
1 cost of working job 1 ω1 rel. to earnings 38.5 21.9 42.2 20.9
2 cost of working job 2 ω2 rel. to earnings 15.7 17.3 16.9 18.8
Hours constraints L H L H
1 SJHer wanting more hours 8.02 26.0 10.4 19.9
2 MJHer wanting more hours on job 1 0.62 1.65 0.42 1.55
3 MJHer wanting more hours on job 2 5.94 5.87 6.38 6.33
4 SJHer wanting fewer hours 24.6 19.3 19.7 47.5
5 MJHer wanting fewer hours on job 1 2.45 2.54 2.96 3.99
6 MJHer wanting fewer hours on job 2 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.02
Moving from MJH to SJH L H L H
1 job 1 ends 24.1 23.9 24.8 24.4
2 job 2 ends, not viable if held by a SJHer 11.3 10.8 12.1 11.0
3 job 2 ends, while viable if held by a SJHer 64.7 65.4 63.1 64.7
Notes: SJHer: single jobholder; MJHer: multiple jobholder; MJH: multiple jobholding. L and H in-
dicate that the curvature parameter γ is set to match respectively low (0.30) and high (0.60) values of
the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. All table entries are expressed in percent.
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Table 4: Source of changes in multiple jobholding
Men Women
Changes in se and ω2 Data L H Data L H
1 % change in se -46.9 -47.2 -39.1 -37.0
2 % change in ω2 13.1 11.5 5.03 6.10
3 E to E trans. prob. -35.3 -34.7 -34.7 -28.5 -29.0 -28.6
4 MJH share -32.6 -32.7 -32.7 -19.6 -19.5 -19.6
Changes in se L H L H
1 E to E trans. prob. – -38.2 -38.1 – -31.1 -31.1
2 MJH share – 9.21 5.91 – 3.30 1.62
Changes in ω2 L H L H
1 E to E trans. prob. – 1.61 2.19 – 0.30 0.58
2 MJH share – -41.7 -38.7 – -21.8 -20.4
Notes: Data moments are computed from the monthly files of the Current Population Survey
and refer to differences in averages between years 1995 and 2015. se: on-the-job search efficiency;
ω2: cost of working job 2; E: employment; MJH: multiple jobholding. L and H indicate that the
curvature parameter γ is set to match respectively low (0.30) and high (0.60) values of the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply. All table entries are expressed in percent.
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Table 5: Implications for search frictions
Men Women
Effects evaluated at s1995e L H L H
1 effect of meeting prob. 67.1 65.8 66.5 57.6
2 effect of matching | meeting 73.5 77.4 84.7 75.2
3 effect of surplus | matching -40.6 -43.1 -51.2 -32.8
4 % change in vacancies 4.58 4.33 2.62 2.72
Effects evaluated at s2015e L H L L
1 effect of meeting prob. 56.1 52.0 44.7 43.9
2 effect of matching | meeting 108.7 102.1 108.5 110.7
3 effect of surplus | matching -64.8 -54.1 -53.3 -54.6
4 % change in vacancies 6.12 6.73 3.43 3.22
Notes: s1995e : on-the-job search efficiency in 1995; s2015e : on-the-job search effi-
ciency in 2015. L and H indicate that the curvature parameter γ is set to match
low (0.30) and high (0.60) values, respectively, of the Frisch elasticity of labor sup-
ply. All table entries are expressed in percent.
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Table 6: Source of changes in multiple jobholding: Additional results
Men Women
Changes in se, ψ and ω2 Data L H Data L H
1 % change in se -51.4 -52.7 -39.5 -38.8
2 % change in ψ 119.0 98.6 76.0 70.2
3 % change in ω2 18.5 17.9 6.24 7.81
4 E to E trans. prob. -35.3 -35.4 -35.2 -28.5 -28.4 -28.8
5 share at 40 hours 28.4 28.6 28.5 25.1 25.0 25.0
6 MJH share -32.6 -32.6 -32.6 -19.6 -20.4 -19.8
Changes in se L H L H
1 E to E trans. prob. – -42.3 -43.4 – -31.4 -32.6
2 share at 40 hours – 0.59 0.40 – -0.36 0.29
3 MJH share – 5.11 3.58 – -1.12 1.25
Changes in ψ L H L H
1 E to E trans. prob. – 3.96 5.93 – 0.55 1.39
2 share at 40 hours – 27.6 24.9 – 24.5 23.7
3 MJH share – 12.9 15.1 – 4.95 5.77
Changes in ω2 L H L H
1 E to E trans. prob. – 1.40 2.23 – 1.08 0.71
2 share at 40 hours – 1.24 1.11 – 0.25 0.51
3 MJH share – -53.8 -53.8 – -20.2 -24.8
Notes: Data moments are computed from the monthly files of the Current Population Survey and
refer to differences in averages between years 1995 and 2015. se: on-the-job search efficiency; ψ: pro-
ductivity gap at h¯ hours; ω2: cost of working job 2; E: employment; MJH: multiple jobholding. L and
H indicate that the curvature parameter γ is set to match low (0.30) and high (0.60) values, respec-
tively, of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. All table entries are expressed in percent.
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Table 7: Implications for search frictions: Additional results
Men Women
Effects evaluated at s1995e and ψ1995 L H L H
1 effect of meeting prob. 63.2 61.9 65.4 71.8
2 effect of matching | meeting 76.6 80.3 77.2 72.9
3 effect of surplus | matching -39.8 -42.3 -42.6 -44.8
4 % change in vacancies 6.35 6.48 2.21 2.49
Effects evaluated at s2015e and ψ2015 L H L L
1 effect of meeting prob. 52.4 54.4 47.2 44.6
2 effect of matching | meeting 103.1 106.6 113.7 104.1
3 effect of surplus | matching -55.6 -61.0 -61.0 -48.7
4 % change in vacancies 8.07 7.50 3.35 4.85
Notes: s1995e : on-the-job search efficiency in 1995; ψ1995: productivity gap at 40 hours in 1995;
s2015e : on-the-job search efficiency in 2015; ψ2015: productivity gap at 40 hours in 2015. L and H
indicate that the curvature parameter γ is set to match respectively low (0.30) and high (0.60)
values of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. All table entries are expressed in percent.
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Figure 1: Reservation thresholds for multiple jobholding and job-to-job transitions
Notes: Both for men and women, the plots are based on the calibration using an intermediate value for the
curvature parameter γ. The solid lines in each plot denote the reservation thresholds for multiple jobholding,
y˜d (y1, z). The dashed lines in each plot denote the reservation thresholds for job-to-job transitions, y˜` (y1, z).
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Figure 2: Targeted data and model-generated moments
Notes: Data moments are computed from the monthly files of the Current Population Survey over the years
1994 to 2018. Both for men and women, the model-generated moments are based on the calibration using an
intermediate value for the curvature parameter γ. E: employment; MJH: multiple jobholding.
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Figure 3: Untargeted data and model-generated moments
Notes: Data moments are computed from the monthly files of the Current Population Survey over the years
1994 to 2018; see Appendix B for details. Both for men and women, the model-generated moments are based
on the calibration using an intermediate value for the curvature parameter γ. FS : single jobholding with a
full-time primary job; PS : single jobholding with a part-time primary job; S = FS +PS : single jobholding; FM :
multiple jobholding working full-time on the primary job; PM : multiple jobholding working part-time on the
primary job; M = FM + PM : multiple jobholding. MJH: multiple jobholding.
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Figure 4: Targeted data and model-generated moments
Notes: Data moments are computed from the monthly files of the Current Population Survey over the years
1994 to 2018. Both for men and women, the model-generated moments are based on the calibration using an
intermediate value for the curvature parameter γ. E: employment; MJH: multiple jobholding.
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